I am convinced there is no military solution, which can make sense in the present situation. I am consequently unable to accept the responsibility for implementing a mission namely, military solution, that would mean civil war … and large scale killings of unarmed civilians and would achieve no sane aim. It would have disastrous consequences.”
Maj Gen Khadim Raja quotes Lt Gen Sahibzada Yaqub Khan (then Commander Eastern Command) from Anwar Dil’s book on the latter in his “A Stranger in My Own Country” As Yaqub resigned, Lt Gen Tikka Khan was flown in as his replacement. Gen Raja tells us of his very first conversation with his new boss on the airport
“Khadim, what the hell has your Division been doing all this time? There is such a bloody mess out there!”
And then Yahya Khan with COAS Gen Hamid arrived in Dhaka on Mar 15. In president’s briefing the same evening, Air Force Commander in Easern Wing Air Commodore Zafar Masud spoke against any military action that might be considered as a solution to the prevailing political crisis
Masud’s point, as Gen Raja tells us, was that such an action would put lives and property of Biharis & West Pakistanis in jeopardy
In the coming days Masud was relieved of his duties and prematurely retired
Yahya’s arrogance cost PAF, a fine officer, a recipient of Hilal e Jurrat
Back to Lt Gen Tikka who on 17th March summoned his two principal subordinates, Maj Gens Khadim Raja & Rao Farman, the latter looked after Civil Affairs in Martial Law duties
They were told to plan a military operation as ‘negotiations with Sheikh Mujeeb did not proceed well’ Now here, Brig Karrar Ali Agha who by the time commanded 11 Wing of East Pakistan Rifles in Comilla brings to us a rather candid version of the story but moves the date to Mar 23 when Yahya said to Raja and Farman duo, “Oh kuch ho raha hey, tayyari mayyari kar lo.”
But the real information of interest that Karrar’s book, “Witness to Carnage 1971”, brings to us is regarding a plan, possibly a predecessor to Operation Searchlight
Some ‘Operation Blitz’ was conceived by Lt Gen Sahibzada Yaqub on the eve of December Elections in 1970 An operational directive was signed and issued on Dec 11, 1970 in limited copies with TOPSEC classification
Operation Blitz was to be launched in the eventuality of an emergency in post election days
It never materialized and over time Yaqub too favoured a political solution Brig Karrar states that Raja & Farman based their planning on Operation Blitz, but Gen Raja tells a different story
On the morning of Mar 18 as Raja & Farman got together to work on ‘the plan’ the bengali ADC to GOC 14 Div was engaged to stay busy on domestic tasks by Mrs Raja
As Farman penned the preamble and mechanics of operations to be executed in Dhaka, Raja allotted troops to task for the rest of East Pakistan province
The plan was approved the same evening with two changes, of which we shall talk in a bit
Gen Raja writes …
“The new plan prepared by Farman and myself, was named ‘Searchlight’. There was no particular significance to this name.”
No written orders were ever issued for Searchlight (Gen Raja included his personal copy in his book which my readers may find at the end of this thread)
Orders for Searchlight were communicated verbally in person by heliborne comanders, through extensive visits. Info disseminated strictly on a need to know basis
The plan was being kept secret from East Pakistani troops who exceeded their West Pakistani brethren in numbers Maj Gen Khadim Raja received instructions to execute Searchlight on night 25/26 March. A go ahead was given by mid-day Mar 25 but they were waiting for ‘clearance’
President Yayha, who had a part to play in the deceptive measures of Operation Searchlight, decided otherwise This was one of the two bits of Searchlight that were not approved
In the words of Maj Gen Raja, “having dumped East Pakistan, the president left Dhaka around 7 PM as part of a cover plan. He seemed more concerned of his personal safety.”
The operation was timed to commence only after the president’s plane had entered West Pakistan airspace.
During later hours of night 25/26 march, as the leading elements of troops in Dhaka were mobilized, the president had already entered the ‘reception zone of Karachi airfield’ The other recommendation of Searchlight to be overruled was to disarm East Bengal Regiment and East Pakistan Rifles
Brig Karrar quotes COAS Gen Hamid as saying “I cannot preside over the disintegration of the Pakistan Army”
The general must be high on something unique Commanders at all levels knew that the Bengali troops were brimming with revolt
A go ahead on Searchlight will put the two factions of Pakistan Army against each other
A sizeable number of military casualties including families were the result of armymen taking on each other In the March of 1971, Pakistan Army had disintegrated much before the disintegration of Pakistan itself …
References:
“A Stranger in My Own Country” by Maj Gen Khadim Hussain Raja
“Witness to Carnage 1971”, by Brig Karrar Ali Agha
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Attached, Operation Instructions of Searchlight, personal copy of Maj Gen Raja from “A Stranger in My Own Country”